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IS “NATIONAL SECURITY LAW”
    INHERENTLY PARADOXICAL?
 STEPHEN I. VLADECK *
I’m perhaps the last person who should be asking the question at the heart of  this essay—
whether “national security law” really deserves to be its own independent fi eld of  study, and, in that 
vein, an appropriate subject for fi eld-specifi c publications such as this one.  I offer this caveat at the 
outset not just because it is perhaps a bit unbecoming on my part to use the pages of  a publication 
to question the entire project to which that publication is dedicated, but because it is also potentially 
hypocritical on a more personal—or at least professional—level.  After all, I am a national security 
law professor who was hired at least largely as such; I am currently the Chair of  the Association of  
American Law Schools’ Section on National Security Law; and I am a senior editor of  the Journal of  
National Security Law and Policy.1  Put simply, without “national security law,” I might well be unem-
ployed.2
Nevertheless, the more time that I spend thinking about, writing, and teaching “national secu-
rity law,” the less I understand what “it” is as a unifi ed whole—and the less comfortable I am with 
what it has increasingly become.  To be sure, there are classical topics that were already understood 
to be part of  the national security law “canon” long before September 11.  Thus, the few pre-9/11 
casebooks in the fi eld3 devoted long chapters and detailed discussion to the constitutional alloca-
tion of  war powers, the international law pertaining to the use of  force, the statutory and constitu-
tional authorities pertaining to the domestic use of  the military, the internal law actually governing the 
military, the practical and legal background to intelligence operations and intelligence gathering (and 
*     Professor of  Law, American University Washington College of  Law.
1  The Journal is a peer-reviewed publication published under the joint sponsorship of  the University of  the Pacifi c 
McGeorge School of  Law and the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism at Syracuse University.
2  To be fair, my own teaching and research interests sweep well beyond national security law. But I suspect that there 
are a not-insignifi cant number of  junior law professors who were hired largely to teach national security law, whether or 
not that was an element of  their ideal course package.
3  See, e.g., STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (1990); 
THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (1987); JOHN NORTON 
MOORE ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (1990); STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (1990). 
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congressional oversight thereof), mechanisms for preserving governmental secrecy and the protec-
tion of  classifi ed information, and similar matters.4  In theory, these areas were easily understood to 
constitute the separate subject of  “national security law” at least largely because they didn’t comfort-
ably fi t either together or within any other preexisting topics,5 even if  many of  the particular sets of  
legal issues seemed little more than unrelated historical curiosities or entirely academic subjects of  
debate.6  Going forward, there is little reason to think these topics are any less central to the fi eld of  
national security law, or any less deserving of  our focus than they were a decade ago.
From a pedagogical and curricular perspective, though, the aftermath of  September 11 has 
dramatically reoriented the fi eld, so much so that authors of  one of  the leading casebooks on 
national security law7 have gone so far as to extract from later editions an entirely separate case-
book on “Counterterrorism Law.”8  To similar effect, new casebooks have emerged in recent years 
on “Terrorism and the Law,”9 “Legal Responses to Terrorism,”10 “Antiterrorism and Criminal 
Enforcement,” 11 “Law and Bioterrorism,”12 and “Global Perspectives on Counterterrorism,”13 
among numerous others. Indeed, many of  these books are now into their second and third post-
September 11 editions—as their authors confront the inherent diffi culty of  trying to cover a fi eld in 
which foundational or paradigm-shifting developments seem to take place almost every day.14
These are merely discrete data points, of  course, and to conclude that there is a greater volume 
of  topics to discuss in national security law is not to say anything about the shifting content of  the 
fi eld.  But if  nothing else, it does appear to be beyond question that the government’s authority to 
respond to the various threats posed by transnational terrorism is likely to become a permanent (if  
not dominant) fi xture of  almost any national security law curriculum going forward, even though 
we have never had a serious conversation about the normative desirability or the pedagogical conse-
quences of  such a shift.
And yet, it is worth stopping to point out that there is an important qualitative difference be-
tween what we used to understand “national security law” to encompass and what it necessarily 
encompasses today, in what we might come to call the age of  counterterrorism.  Rather than just an 
4  Indeed, the volume by John Norton Moore and his coauthors is perhaps better described as an anthology of  these 
issues than a casebook.
5  See generally Stephen Dycus, The Law Teacher as Peacemaker: National Security in the Classroom, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 42, 43 
(2005) (noting that the author’s fi rst casebook on the subject contained aspects of  constitutional law, administrative law, 
procedure, and history).
6 See, e.g., Scott L. Silliman, Teaching National Security Law, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 161, 163 (2005) (citing the use of  
the political question doctrine and the War Powers Resolution during the Vietnam Confl ict as historical examples of  
national security law).
7  See STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (4th ed. 2007).
8  STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., COUNTERTERRORISM LAW (2007).
9 GREGORY E. MAGGS, TERRORISM AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2005).
10 WAYNE MCCORMACK, LEGAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM (2d ed. 2008).
11 NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT (3d ed. 2008). 
12 VICTORIA SUTTON, LAW AND BIOTERRORISM (2003).
13 AMOS N. GUIORA, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON COUNTERTERRORISM (2007).
14 See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 2 (describing the rapid pace of  change in the fi eld).
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amalgamation of  sui generis bodies of  law dealing with discrete and usually war-related topics, nation-
al security law today is increasingly about the extent to which entirely ordinary substantive doctrines 
may or may not necessitate extraordinary exceptions based upon “national security” considerations. 
Put differently, there is now a robust Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of  national security.15  
There is a less-robust but clearly emerging Fifth Amendment jurisprudence of  national security.16 
There may even be a growing Sixth Amendment jurisprudence of  national security, 17 at least to the 
extent that amorphous “national security” considerations have begun to surface in certain types of  
Confrontation Clause analysis. 18  More generally, a long list of  scholars, commentators, and even for-
mer jurists have endorsed calls for a “national security court”—an entirely separate judicial tribunal 
for certain kinds of  national security-related lawsuits.19  And even remedial doctrines that were never 
understood by reference to “national security” have increasingly been construed to exclude certain 
categories of  “national security” cases from their sweep.20
In short, national security law is increasingly part of  the fabric of  far more conventional courses 
and doctrines—it is one part criminal procedure, one part evidence, one part substantive criminal 
law, one part constitutional law, and even one part administrative law.  And the reverse is just as true: 
criminal procedure today is partly national security law.  Evidence today is partly national security 
law.  And so on. Even in areas as seemingly unrelated as banking regulation,21 telecommunications 
15 As just one example, consider the recognition by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of  Review—in 
only its second published decision ever—of  a categorical “foreign intelligence surveillance” exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s Warrant Clause. See In re Directives . . . Pursuant to Section 105B of  the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1010–12 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (analogizing the Foreign Intelligence Exception to the Warrant Clause 
which the Supreme Court has not ruled upon with the Special Needs Exception, which the Court has validated).
16 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (holding that the Due Process Clause bars the potentially 
indefi nite detention of  immigrants pending their deportation, but noting that the decision did not consider “terrorism 
or other special circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of  preventive detention and for 
heightened deference to the judgments of  the political branches with respect to matters of  national security”).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 240–41 (4th Cir. 2008) (explaining that national security and 
counterterrorism considerations qualify as an “important public policy” weighing in favor of  the introduction at trial of  
deposition testimony taken outside the presence of  the defendant notwithstanding the Confrontation Clause). 
18 See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Terrorism Trials and the Article III Courts After Abu Ali, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1501, 1520–23 
(2010) (explaining how “national security” concerns affected the Fourth Circuit’s Confrontation Clause analysis).
19 See, e.g., GLENN SULMASY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM: A NATURAL EVOLUTION OF JUSTICE IN AN AGE 
OF TERROR (2009). For a critique of  these proposals, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case Against National Security Courts, 45 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 505 (2009).
20 See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding that courts should decline to infer Bivens 
remedies in “rendition” cases because of  the various national security concerns such relief  would implicate), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010). I have argued elsewhere that such analysis has the relevant considerations entirely backwards. See 
Stephen I. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255 (2010).
21 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror, WASH. POST, June 23, 2006, 
at A1. Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror, NEW YORK TIMES, June 23, 2006, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel.html.
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law,22 and the First Amendment,23 just to name a few, one need not look particularly hard these days 
to fi nd pressing questions that stem at least in part from claims that the current national security cli-
mate somehow alters—or provides a justifi cation for departure from—the preexisting norm.24  For a 
fi eld that had virtually no full-time tenure-track teachers at the beginning of  the last decade, national 
security law has not just become ubiquitous in U.S. law schools, but national security scholars have, 
oddly enough, become quasi-generalists in order to understand the broader legal doctrines and bod-
ies of  jurisprudence into which their fi eld has increasingly expanded.
From the perspective of  academic employment opportunities, this shift is almost certainly wel-
come.  But I fear that, at the theoretical level, one could just as easily paint these developments as a 
strange but sure example of  the “normalization of  emergency,” or what Harold Lasswell famously 
described as the “Garrison State”25—the idea that the more we specifi cally think about and provide 
for how the law should accommodate exceptional cases, the more the exceptions will normalize into 
the rule.  And therein lies the rub:  the questions for the courts in all of  these cases become whether 
the national security concerns justify creating a separate body of  doctrine—new rules for new 
cases—or whether extant doctrine can adequately account for the government’s arguably unique 
(and undeniably compelling) interests in preventing future acts of  terrorism.  Thus, to accept the 
project of  “national security law” in its entirety is to accept, at a fairly fundamental level, the no-
tion that there should be special rules in these special cases—it is to have a clear position as to a fairly 
fundamental intellectual question at the heart of  our fi eld.  Otherwise, there would be no need to 
teach, discuss, or write about these cases separately from the coverage they would receive as part of  
ordinary doctrine in more traditional coursework.26 
To illustrate the point, consider the so-called “special needs” doctrine in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, which traces its origins to a series of  decisions in the 1980s.  The doctrine exists to 
allow certain mass, warrantless, suspicionless searches when “the ‘special need’ that was advanced 
as a justifi cation for the absence of  a warrant or individualized suspicion was one divorced from the 
State’s general interest in law enforcement.”27  So long as the state is not really trying to evade the 
warrant requirement in the ordinary context of  law enforcement, “special needs” may provide justi-
fi cation for searches that the Fourth Amendment might otherwise prohibit. 
Thus, the Supreme Court under the special needs doctrine has approved random drug testing of  
22 See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (describing a case brought by AT & T 
customers alleging the company was collaborating with the National Security Agency in performing illegal, warrantless 
surveillance of  domestic and foreign communications).
23 In a pair of  high-profi le cases in 2002, the Third and Sixth Circuits split on whether the “Creppy Memo,” which 
ordered the categorical closure to the public of  any deportation proceeding deemed to be of  “special interest,” violated 
the First Amendment. Compare N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), with Detroit Free 
Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
24 See, e.g., John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765 (2007). 
25 Harold D. Lasswell, The Garrison State, 46 AM. J. SOC. 455, 455 (1941).
26 For more on this point, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Foreword: National Security’s Distortion Effects, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
285 (2010).
27 Ferguson v. City of  Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001).
15NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEFVol. 1, No. 1
student athletes,28 drug tests for certain U.S. Customs Service employees,29 drug and alcohol tests for 
railway employees involved in accidents or other safety violations,30 checkpoints for witnesses to a 
recent hit-and-run accident,31 and highway sobriety checkpoints,32 among others.  The Court has also 
emphasized the need carefully to cabin the special needs “exception,” striking down drug interdic-
tion checkpoints in Indianapolis33 and urine tests for obstetrics patients in South Carolina34 based 
on the conclusion that the checkpoints were primarily meant to serve a traditional law-enforcement 
purpose.
And yet, when New York City instituted a program for mass, suspicionless searches of  passen-
gers entering its subway system after the 2005 attack on the London Underground, the program was 
upheld by both the district court and the Second Circuit pursuant to the special needs doctrine.35  As 
Judge Straub explained for the Court of  Appeals, “preventing a terrorist attack on the subway is a 
‘special’ need within the meaning of  the doctrine,”36 since.
As a legal matter, courts traditionally have considered special the government’s need to “pre-
vent” and “discover . . . latent or hidden” hazards, in order to ensure the safety of  mass transporta-
tion mediums, such as trains, airplanes, and highways.  We have no doubt that concealed explosives 
are a hidden hazard, that the Program’s purpose is prophylactic, and that the nation’s busiest subway 
system implicates the public’s safety.  Accordingly, preventing a terrorist from bombing the subways 
constitutes a special need that is distinct from ordinary post hoc criminal investigation.37
The merits of  the Second Circuit’s holding aside, it seems fairly clear that random, suspicion-
less searches on mass public transportation systems are a fairly signifi cant step past the carefully 
circumscribed circumstances in which the Supreme Court had previously applied the “special needs” 
doctrine.  At the very least, the fact that preventing transnational terrorism includes a heavy law-
enforcement and criminal law-based emphasis poses a tension between the normative persuasiveness 
of  the claim that preventing terrorism is “special,” and the doctrinal coherence of  relying on unre-
lated prior precedents to justify the searches.38
28 See Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664 (1995).
29 See Nat’l Treasury Employees  Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989).
30 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989).
31 See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427–28 (2004).
32 See Mich. Dep’t of  State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 456 (1990).
33 See City of  Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–48 (2000). [Same as n.27.]
34 See Ferguson v. City of  Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001). [Same as n.27.]
35 MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 275 (2d Cir. 2006).
36 Id. at 263.
37 Id. at 270–71.
38 The same can be said about the debate over whether FISA warrants can be used to obtain evidence for use in 
ordinary criminal prosecutions. Before the USA PATRIOT Act of  2001, courts had conditioned the validity of  FISA 
warrants on the government’s assertion that the “primary purpose” of  the surveillance was to gather foreign intelligence. 
The USA PATRIOT Act relaxed that requirement to “signifi cant purpose,” and in the process greatly increased the 
likelihood that evidence obtained through FISA would make its way into run-of-the-mill criminal cases. Compare, e.g., In re 
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (upholding this provision in the USA PATRIOT Act), with Mayfi eld 
v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1042–43 (D. Or. 2007) (holding that the “signifi cant purpose” standard violates 
the Fourth Amendment). 
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To similar effect is a recent development in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence:  In an unprec-
edented situation, federal prosecutors arranged to depose Saudi intelligence offi cials via live two-way 
video link in order to corroborate inculpatory statements made by Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a U.S. 
citizen suspected of  involvement in various terrorist plots, while in Saudi custody.39 
Although the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause generally requires that the defendant 
be present in such circumstances, the Supreme Court had previously recognized an exception for 
cases in which the testimony in the defendant’s absence is “necessary to further an important pub-
lic policy,” and “the reliability of  the testimony is otherwise assured.”40  As to the fi rst part of  the 
test set out in Maryland v. Craig, the Fourth Circuit concluded in Abu Ali that the specifi c interest in 
preventing terrorism was a suffi ciently important public policy.  As the Court of  Appeals explained, 
“[t]he prosecution of  those bent on infl icting mass civilian casualties or assassinating high public of-
fi cials is . . . just the kind of  important public interest contemplated by the Craig decision.”41  More-
over, “[i]f  the government is fl atly prohibited from deposing foreign offi cials anywhere but in the 
United States, this would jeopardize the government’s ability to prosecute terrorists using the domes-
tic criminal justice system.”42
Thus, because “requiring face-to-face confrontation here would have precluded the government 
from relying on the Saudi offi cers’ important testimony,”43 the court sustained the district court’s 
accommodation.  And in the process, the court distinguished a seemingly contraindicated decision 
by the en banc Eleventh Circuit,44 focusing on the absence of  national security considerations in 
that case:  “Whatever the merits of  the holding in Yates, the defendants there were charged with mail 
fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and drug-related offenses, crimes different in both 
kind and degree from those implicating the national security interests here.”45  In other words, na-
tional security concerns provided a compelling example of  an “important public policy” in a context 
where analogous concerns about prevention and punishment had previously proved inadequate.
The point of  these examples is not to criticize either court’s invocation of  national security con-
cerns, or to disagree with their handling of  the merits—a point on which I suspect reasonable peo-
ple can agree to disagree.  Rather, these cases exemplify the distortion effect that national security 
considerations are having, and will continue to have, on otherwise well-established and settled bodies 
of  doctrine—be it the special needs doctrine in the context of  the Fourth Amendment, or the Craig 
rule in the context of  the Confrontation Clause.  Nor is this effect limited to the cases noted above; 
one need not look far to fi nd allusions to the unique challenges posed by the threat of  transnational 
39 See Vladeck, supra note 17 (discussing the case in thorough detail).
40 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990).
41 United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 241 (4th Cir. 2008).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 See United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that a live, two-way video conference 
testimony on a television monitor violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights). 
45 Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 242-43 n.12 (citation omitted).
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terrorism across the jurisprudential landscape.46  The question then becomes whether the courts are 
better off  creating a hermetically sealed body of  specialized “national security law” for those cases 
(as a means of  protecting extant doctrine and preventing its distortion), or whether they fi nd ways to 
adapt extant doctrine to account for the unique challenges such cases pose.
This is why I fi nd the conversation over the status of  “national security law” as a fi eld distinct 
from similar debates that have preoccupied scholars in a number of  other legal fi elds in recent 
years.47  I suspect there is less of  a fundamental disagreement in, for example, mass media law or en-
vironmental law, over whether it is anathema to core constitutional values to even have a special body 
of  law to govern these cases. In those areas, at least, such a conversation is a policy debate, rather 
than one fraught with constitutional diffi culties.
To be frank, I have confl icting views as to what the “answer” is and should be.  It is certainly 
true that, even without counterterrorism law, there is still plenty of  doctrine to teach in a more 
classical (i.e., pre-September 11) type of  national security course.  But I also suspect that those who 
teach and write about national security law however defi ned, including in the pages of  this and fu-
ture issues of  the National Security Law Brief, would do well to spend more time asking what justifi es a 
separate corpus of  law for national security cases.
46 Post-9/11 national security considerations also pose challenges for areas more traditionally part of  national security 
law, including the diffi culty of  applying international humanitarian law to non-state actors such as al Qaeda.  See, e.g., Al-
Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F. 3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Motz, J., concurring) (asserting that enemy combatant status 
cannot be conferred on a member of  a non-state terrorist organization, as such an organization cannot be engaged in 
international hostilities for the purposes of  the Third Geneva Convention).
47 For a lucid discussion, see Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL  L. 
REV. 221 (2010).
